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ABSTRACT
Aggregate consumption Euler equations fit financial asset return data poorly. But they fit the return
on the capital stock well, which leads us to three empirical findings relating to the capital income
tax burden. First, capital taxation drives a wedge between consumption growth and the expected pre-
tax capital return. Second, capital taxation is the major distortion in the capital market, in the sense
that most of the medium and long run deviations between expected consumption growth and the
expected pre-tax capital return are associated with capital taxation. Third, consumption growth
appears to be pretty elastic to the after-tax capital return (i.e., capital is elastically supplied), even
while it appears inelastic to returns on various financial assets. Capital income taxes are passed on
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and NBER
c-mulligan@uchicago.edu1Feldstein (1995) is one important step in this direction, considering the variety of
responses to individual income taxation as summarized by taxable income.
I.  Introduction
Capital income taxes are important because they produce revenue for the Treasury, and may
have significant effects on capital accumulation and the distribution of after-tax income.  Although
the consumption Euler equation is about some of the intertemporal choice associated with capital
accumulation, and has been the subject of many empirical investigations, the aggregate consumption
Euler equation literature might seem a poor source of information on the burden of capital income
taxes.  After all, public finance theory seems to speak about the behavior of individual households
and firms, whereas aggregate measures of behavior may be complicated functions of heterogeneity
and many dimensions of individual behavior.  In practice, aggregate consumption Euler equations
fit poorly, and rarely include measures of capital taxation (eg., Hansen and Singleton 1983).
But the complicated nature of aggregate behavior, and the poor fit of empirical Euler
equations are precisely the reasons why aggregate consumption Euler equations are so informative.
First of all, some of the questions of primary interest in public finance such as tax policy
consequences for aggregate deadweight costs and the amount of revenue received by the Treasury,
are questions about aggregates.  These aggregates are determined by behaviors on a number of
different margins, and it can be informative to look at aggregates directly.
1  For example, even if a
careful microeconometric study showed us that firms use capital and labor in fixed proportions, we
should not conclude that capital is inelastically demanded, because capital may adjust via the shut
down of capital intensive operations.
Second, and maybe more important, the poor fit of consumption Euler equations tells us that
financial asset prices are determined mainly by factors unrelated to the supply of and demand for
capital.  Even if the data showed that, say, bond interest rates were uncorrelated with rates of
consumption growth, or uncorrelated with rates of capital accumulation, we cannot easily draw
conclusions about the supply and demand for capital because bond rates could be very weaklyConsumption Euler Equations - 2
correlated with returns to capital owners, or costs of capital users.
With these features in mind, this paper uses aggregate consumption Euler equations to
describe the capital income tax burden, and obtains three empirical results using U.S. data.  First,
capital taxation drives a wedge between consumption growth and the expected pre-tax capital return.
Second, capital taxation is the major distortion in the capital market, in the sense that most of the
medium and long run deviations between expected consumption growth and the expected pre-tax
capital return are associated with capital taxation.  Third, consumption growth appears to be pretty
elastic to the after-tax capital return, even while it appears inelastic to returns on various financial
assets.
II. The Tax Wedge from the Euler Equation Perspective
Consider a capital income tax levied on consumers at rate τt on their capital income in year
t.  Let rt
i denote the pre-tax return on asset i between years t-1 and t, net of principal and
depreciation.  In order to focus on the potential lessons from Euler equation analysis, let’s suppose
that asset i’s “capital income” for tax purposes is rt
i per dollar of capital in place in year t-1, so that
the after-tax return net of principal is (1-τt)rt
i.  Obviously we are not modeling the tax system in its
full reality, because we implicitly assume that the capital income tax base includes real rather than
nominal interest, deducts real economic depreciation, includes real capital gains upon accrual, etc.,
although adjustments of the tax rate might help bring the model a little closer to reality in these
dimensions.
One margin of substitution for the representative consumer is therefore to forego one unit
of consumption in year t-1 in return for [1+(1-τt)rt
i] units in year t.  The return, and perhaps even the
tax rate, may be uncertain, so the first order condition equates “in expectation” the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution (hereafter, IMRS) to the gross return [1+(1-τt)rt
i].  More precisely, when
using the familiar power consumption growth formula for the IMRS, we have a consumption Euler
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where  ct is consumption in year t.  σ is often interpreted as the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, and ρ as the rate of time preference.
Empirical failures of the Euler equation (1) are seen in a variety of ways.  For example, the
equation suggests that expected consumption growth should be correlated with expected after-tax
asset returns (either because high expected returns encourage delayed consumption, or because
investors demand high returns when they are delaying their consumption), but these correlations are
hard to find when the assets in question are any of the familiar financial assets, like Treasury Bills,
or the S&P 500 (Hall 1988).  Or equation (1) can be differenced for asset i and asset j, implying that
asset i has a greater expected return than asset j to the extent that asset i’s return has the higher
covariance with consumption growth.  While it seems easy to find empirical examples of assets with
different expected returns (e.g., stocks versus bonds), it is hard to attribute the excess expected
returns to consumption risk (Mehra and Prescott 1985).
It is important to extend asset pricing theory beyond the Euler equation (1), but Mulligan
(2004) argues that many such extensions (both existing and still undeveloped) can be summarized
according to the Euler equation (1)N
where α generally varies over time and across assets.  The α’s may be interpreted as subjective
probability adjustments (Harrison and Kreps 1979, Cagetti et al 2002), reflections of asset-specific
clientele (Alvarez and Jermann 2001), liquidity services, other financial market frictions, etc., but
Mulligan (2004) emphasizes two (empirically refutable) implications that are common to many
interpretations.  First, α is one for the capital stock, so the capital stock is well priced withConsumption Euler Equations - 4
2For simplicity we use the assumption that capital income tax rates are known at least one
year ahead.
3For example, alternative theories might assume that capital taxes are unanticipated, or
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consumption alone (equivalently, capital’s expected return is a good predictor of consumption
growth).  Second, assets in small net aggregate supply – including Treasury Bills and even the S&P
500 – have their prices determined by additional factors, embodied in the α’s, independent from
average consumption.  One reason for these results is that assets in small net aggregate supply have
special clientele, whereas the average consumer (whose consumption appears in the Euler equation)
is holding the average asset – something like the capital stock.
Since α = 1 for the capital stock, equations (1) and (1)N are a particular form of the familiar
public finance proposition that (anticipated) capital income taxes drive a wedge between the pre-tax
capital return r
k (which, under familiar conditions, is the marginal product of capital) and the IMRS.
Conversely, this theory says that any wedge between r
k and the IMRS is entirely attributed to capital
income taxation.  In order to focus on the tax wedge, it is useful to rearrange equation (1) in order
to separate the public and private behaviors, as in equation (1)O:
2
The LHS of (1)O is the capital income tax rate, determined by the government, and the RHS is the
wedge between the pre-tax capital return r
k and IMRS, determined by savers, investors, and
technology.  LHS is not only supposed to be positively correlated with RHS, but the two are
supposed to fluctuate in equal amounts – fundamental implications of this theory which need not be
confirmed by the data.
3
The theory works well at medium and low frequencies.  Figure 1 displays 5-year moving
averages of three time series, 1947-97.  The first (solid) is a measure of the LHS of (1)O, namelyConsumption Euler Equations - 5
4“Capital income tax revenue” includes revenues from federal, state, and local corporate
income, property, and (a portion of) personal income taxes.  Capital income is from the National
Income and Product Accounts.  This measure follows statutory tax rates pretty closely; see
Mulligan (2003a) for more details.
capital income tax revenue per dollar of capital income.
4  The other two are measures of the wedge
between r
k and IMRS, calculated by assuming a particular value for σ (2.5 for the dashed series, as
suggested by Mulligan’s 2002 estimates; 1.13 for the dash-dot, as suggested by Table 1 below),
measuring r
k as pre-tax capital income per dollar of capital, measuring c as real nondurable and
services consumption expenditures per person age 15+, calculating expectations as fitted values
from VARs, and calibrating ρ so that the resulting time series had the same average level as the
measured tax rates.Consumption Euler Equations - 6
Figure 1  Capital Income Taxation has Driven a Wedge between r
k and IMRS
Prior to the Kennedy tax cut, the wedge is fairly constant (i.e., consumption growth roughly
followed the expected pre-tax capital return), very much like the measured tax rate.  The Kennedy
tax cut does not seem to fit the theory, because pre-tax return and consumption growth moved apart
rather than moving together.  Since then, the three time series are similar – all declining about 13
percentage points 1970-83, and all increasing since 1983, although the wedges increase more since
1988.  All series move in a range with similar breadth – all have a maximum about 15-20 percentage
points above their minimum.
Results would be very different if we had used the return on a financial asset like commercial
paper or the S&P 500, rather than the capital stock, because the consumption Euler equation fitsConsumption Euler Equations - 7
financial asset returns much worse.  For example, while the annual time series standard deviation
of the LHS of equation (1) – calculated using the same measures and similar VARS as in the
construction of Figure 1 – is only 0.006 for the capital return, it is 0.025 for the commercial paper
return, and 0.076 for the S&P 500 return (Mulligan 2004).  At best, financial asset returns are noisy
indicators of capital income tax wedges.  At worst, some of the asset pricing puzzles (the α’s in our
notation) respond to tax policy, so that financial asset returns could systematically overstate or
understate capital income tax wedges, and the financial asset Euler equations would systematically
bias estimates of tax policy consequences.
III. The Elasticity of Capital Supply
The elasticity of capital supply is a critical parameter for forecasting the economic incidence
and impacts of capital income tax policies, and even some labor tax policies, such as those “phased
in” over time (Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987, p. 50).  The consumption Euler equation literature tells
us a lot about estimating that parameter.  Namely, because the consumption Euler equations fit
financial asset returns so poorly, the elasticity is likely to be underestimated by one or two orders
of magnitude by the elasticity of consumption growth with respect to a financial asset return.
Table 1 reports estimates of the elasticity of consumption growth with respect to an expected
asset return, using 51 postwar annual observations.  The specifications differ according to the asset
for which the return is measured.  The first row is a regression of consumption growth on the real
commercial paper return (namely, the nominal yield promised in year t-1 minus inflation between
t-1 and t), instrumenting using the lagged real commercial paper return, and other lagged variables.
The regression coefficient is usually interpreted as an elasticity with respect to the expected return,
because the fitted value from the first stage is something like an expected return.  As Hall (1988)
found for a similar regression, the return coefficient is economically insignificant.  Results are
similar when we exchange the commercial paper return for another financial asset return, such as
the S & P 500 return used in the second row.  Results are dramatically different if capital’s after-tax
return  is used, as shown in the last specification.  The elasticity of consumption growth with respectConsumption Euler Equations - 8
5The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.57 is less than two, although the Cochrane-Orcutt
estimate of the error term first order serial correlation coefficient is insignificantly different from
zero.  It may also seem that the large elasticity shown in the Table’s 3
rd row could also be
explained by savings “rules of thumb”, but Mulligan (2002 pp. 35-6, 2003 pp. 19-20) shows that
constant savings rate rules are inconsistent with the tax wedges shown Figure 1 and with the
relation between consumption growth and lags of r
k.
to the return is greater than one, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.6 to 1.7.
5
Table 1: Asset Returns and Consumption Growth, 1947-97











Notes: (1)  Each row in the table is a TSLS regression.
(2) Dependent variable is ln(ct/ct-1), with ct as year t nondurables and services expenditure per capita.  coefficient
standard errors in parenthesis.  constant terms are estimated, but not reported in the table.
(3)  First stage regression is actual return on lagged return, lagged nominal commercial paper yield (promised for
maturity in year t), lagged BAA minus AAA promised bond yield, lagged inflation rate.
(4)  BEA capital return is after-tax.  Mulligan (2002, 2004) reports more details
IV. Capital Income Tax Incidence
Over the 20
th Century in the U.S., there is a clear negative correlation between the log of the
pre-tax capital return rt
k and the log of the after-capital-income-tax share (1-τt) (Krzyzaniak and
Musgrave 1963, updated by Feldstein et al 1983 and Mulligan 2003).  The simplest, but possibly
naive, interpretation of this correlation is that firms respond to capital taxation by raising prices and
or moving up their capital demand curve, thereby passing on the capital income tax.  Economists
have long hesitated to adopt this simple interpretation, because capital tax rates seem correlated with
non-tax determinants of economic activity.  For example, tax rates were high during WWII and low
during the Great Depression, and we doubt that tax policy alone was responsible for the high and
low pre-tax capital returns, respectively.Consumption Euler Equations - 9
What would be the correlation if we could control for non-tax determinants of the business
cycle?  Consumption Euler equations may help produce an estimate of the supply elasticity of capital
(see above), so that we could simulate the economic responses to capital taxation in the absence of
a business cycle.  But consumption Euler equations also suggest direct empirical estimates of capital
income tax incidence, by emphasizing the tax-induced wedge between r
k and consumption growth.
Namely, consumption growth, raised to the appropriate power, is a variable that might capture other
determinants of the business cycle.  For example, to the extent that consumption growth was low
during the Great Depression, the Euler equation attributes low pre-tax capital returns to the
Depression, and not a lack of capital taxation as the raw correlation between r
k and τ might suggest.
So the empirical tax incidence question becomes:  does capital taxation drive a wedge between
consumption growth and pre-tax capital returns?  Figure 1 suggests that capital taxation does drive
a wedge, so that capital income taxes are passed on either immediately through higher prices
charged by firms, or (to the extent that the marginal product of capital diminishes) eventually
through reduced capital accumulation.
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